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THE NEGLIGENT COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTION TORT: IMPOSING COMMON
LAW LIABILITY ON MERCHANTS FOR SALES
AND LEASES TO "DEFECTIVE" CUSTOMERS
I. THE EXPANDING LIMITS OF BUSINESS LIABILITY
Courts have described tort law as a sensitive balance between two
opposing goals: compensating a plaintiff for injuries inflicted by an-
other,1 and limiting a tortfeasor's liability to something less than the infi-
nite consequences of his tortious act.2 Tort law involves a combination
of statutory and common law; however, some jurists have asserted that
the "development of the law of torts is peculiarly a function of the judici-
ary."' 3 That philosophy has led to judicial legislation in areas of tort law
traditionally shaped by statute.4 Specifically, several courts have im-
posed judge-made tort liability on businesses for transactions involving
the sale or lease of nondefective products5 to "incompetent" or "inexperi-
enced" users. 6
This new tort, which this Note labels "negligent commercial trans-
actions," arises when (1) a merchant negligently sells or leases a product
(2) to a youthful, incompetent, or inexperienced user (3) who the
merchant knows or should know is incompetent or inexperienced in the
product's use, and (4) the sold or leased product proximately causes in-
1. See, eg., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968)
('[Wle cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for
every substantial wrong.").
2. See, eg., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Somewhere a point
will be reached when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous-that what is claimed to
be consequence is only fortuity."), cert denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
3. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 303 (Okla. 1986).
4. See, eg., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). In Rappaport, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that an illegal sale of liquor to a minor (and, the court said in dicta, to an
intoxicated person) under circumstances in which the seller should have known that the buyer was
underage (or drunk) constitutes negligence. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9. The court reasoned that in
the absence of a civil liability statute in New Jersey, imposing common law dram shop liability for
sales of alcohol to minors and intoxicated persons "will strengthen and give greater force to the
enlightened [criminal] statutory and regulatory precautions against such sales and their frightening
consequences." Id. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10. The court reached its result even though the New Jersey
legislature had repealed the Prohibition-era statutes that had imposed strict liability for damages
flowing from illegal sales. See 1932 N.J. Laws 453-54 (repealing Act of Mar. 29, 1921, 1921 N.J.
Laws 184); 1934 N.J. Laws 83, 104 (repealing Act of Mar. 17, 1922, 1922 N.J. Laws 628).
5. "Products," as used in this Note, refers to goods sold or leased in commercial transactions;
the term does not refer to services.
6. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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jury to the customer's innocent employees or other third persons. 7 The
negligent commercial transaction tort is distinguishable from other torts
involving commercial transactions in that it ignores issues of product lia-
bility and design defect, 8 and it may lead to liability whether or not the
transaction at issue is statutorily proscribed. 9 Moreover, the negligent
commercial transaction tort is unusually potent. In states such as Cali-
fornia and Missouri, judges have granted relief to injured third parties far
removed from the commercial transactions that preceded the third par-
ties' actionable injuries.10
The negligent commercial transaction tort has found increasing ju-
dicial acceptance principally because of an imaginative tactic in personal
injury litigation. Plaintiffs have learned to overcome restrictive princi-
ples of recovery, such as respondeat superior and workers' compensation,
by arguing for an extension of the policies underlying statutory prohibi-
tion of certain business transactions." For example, a plaintiff might
argue that a state law proscribing the sale of guns to minors is logically
designed to prevent merchants from selling weapons to any immature
7. See, e.g., Dillon v. Suburban Motors, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 233, 212 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365-66
(opinion omitted from California Appellate Reports at California Supreme Court's direction) (recog-
nizing common law right of action against dealership that sold car to unlicensed 17-year-old), dis-
missed as moot, 705 P.2d 1260, 218 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1985) (en bane); Henderson Bros. Stores v.
Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 918-20, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875, 883-84 (1981) (discussing elements of
common law cause of action in suit by owner of damaged warehouse against merchant who sold tar
kettle, which later exploded, to roofing contractor); Johnson v. Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d 272, 273-
74, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81, 82-83 (1961) (seminal case recognizing common law right of action against
used-car dealer who sold car to unlicensed and incompetent driver); Fowler v. Park Corp., 673
S.W.2d 749, 761 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (setting out necessary elements of
tort claim against railroad yard owner for negligently leasing railroad engine to tenant); Barsness v.
General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 842 (N.D. 1986) (upholding injured construction
worker's common law claim against lessor of construction equipment for negligently leasing crane to
inexperienced operator).
8. See, e.g., Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Home, 505 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (no allegation that "negligently" sold car was defective), aff'd, No. 70,499, slip op. (Fla. Sept.
1, 1988) (Vestlaw, 1988 WL 93694); see also White v. Chrysler Corp., 421 Mich. 197, 198, 364
N.W.2d 619, 621 (1984) (employee's negligent entrustment action for damages after hands crushed
by power-press dies not based on defective design or manufacture, although inherent danger of prod-
uct considered); Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 720, 311 N.W.2d 725, 728
(1981) (products liability pleaded as alternative to negligent entrustment).
9. See, e.g., Roland v. Golden Bay Chevrolet, 161 Cal. App. 3d 102, 207 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1984)
(opinion omitted from California Appellate Reports) (upholding cause of action against car dealer for
selling vehicle to allegedly incompetent driver, although sale violated no statute), dismissed as moot,
704 P.2d 175, 217 Cal. Rptr. 415 (Cal. 1985) (en bane).
10. See, e.g., Dillon, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64 (automobile accident occurred weeks after sale);
Fowler, 673 S.W.2d at 751 (injury occurred eight days after entrustment of railroad engine).
11. Cf Woods, Negligent Entrustment Revisited: Developments 1966-76, 30 ARK. L. REV. 288
(1976) (discussing extension of doctrine generally, and specifically in relation to respondeat
superior).
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person.12 This approach allows some plaintiffs to avoid traditional barri-
ers against recovery 13 and thus tap into the deeper pockets of American
business. 14 So far, negligent commercial transaction suits have targeted
the sellers or lessors of tar kettles, t5 construction cranes,' 6 railroad en-
gines,' 7 gasoline,18 and automobiles 19 that have caused injury to persons
other than buyers or lessees.
This Note will discuss the development of the negligent commercial
transaction tort in light of recent judicial interpretation of section 390 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines the tort known as "neg-
ligent entrustment"; 20 the common law precedent of dram shop liabil-
ity;21 and the judicial perception that many injured plaintiffs deserve
more compensation than traditional legal theories offer. 22 The Note will
12. See, e.g., Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In
Angell, a gun dealer sold a rifle to an adult female who had behaved oddly and unsafely while in the
store. Shortly after the sale, the woman used the weapon to kill someone. The administratrix of the
decedent's estate unsuccessfully attempted to state a cause of action against the gun dealer under
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.17 (West 1976), which proscribes sales of weapons to minors and persons of
unsound mind. The court, notwithstanding the failure of the statutory claim, recognized a common
law action against the dealer for negligently selling the gun. 363 So. 2d at 572.
13. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing respondeat superior); infra notes
57-70 and accompanying text (discussing workers' compensation).
14. Cf Love v. New York Times Co., 691 F.2d 261, 262 (6th Cir. 1982) (would-be publisher,
who failed to launch a magazine, tries to recoup financial losses from deep pocket of innocent pub-
lisher); Monroe v. Interlock Steel Co., 128 Misc. 2d 28, 30, 487 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(plaintiff sues successor corporation because, as court indicated, "the once deep pockets of the sole
proprietor have, in all likelihood, been emptied into the now deep, but secure, pockets of the succes-
sor corporation").
15. Henderson Bros. Stores v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981) (owner
of damaged warehouse sues seller of tar kettle for selling to allegedly incompetent roofing
contractor).
16. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986) (suit by injured
construction worker against company that leased crane to inexperienced operator).
17. Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (suit by railroad car sand-
blaster against lessor of switch engine who leased to inexperienced operator).
18. O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Serv. Station, 202 Cal. App. 3d 151, 247 Cal. Rptr. 663, 671
(ordered not published in California Appellate Reports; opinion appears in California Reporter ad-
vance sheets) (owner of gas station that sold gasoline to clearly intoxicated driver may be held liable
for deaths caused in subsequent collision), review denied, [no docket number] (Cal. Aug. 18, 1988)
(LEXIS, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 220); Roberts v. Shop & Go, Inc., 502 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (suit by victims, burned when gasoline purchaser threw and ignited gasoline, against conven-
ience store that sold gasoline).
19. Roland v. Golden Bay Chevrolet,,161 Cal. App. 3d 102, 207 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1984) (opinion
omitted from California Appellate Report) (suit by plaintiff, injured in car accident with unlicensed
reckless driver, against dealership that sold car to driver), dismissed as moot, 704 P.2d 175, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (Cal. 1985) (en banc); Tosh v. Scott, 129 Ill. App. 3d 322, 472 N.E.2d 591 (1984) (suit
against father who sold automobile to his son).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); infra notes 31-44 and accompanying
text. The Restatement (Second) does not use the term "negligent entrustment."
21. See infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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then analyze cases that have considered the tort.23 Lastly, the Note will
argue for judicial restraint in extending businesses' liability beyond limits
already established by statute,24 noting that in the course of compensat-
ing plaintiffs, courts can unwittingly impose unreasonable and uncertain
duties on industries competing in American markets. These uncertain
judge-made duties can, in turn, have an adverse impact on the national
economy. 25
II. NEGLIGENCE INVOLVING THE SALE OR LEASE OF GOODS
The negligent commercial transaction tort has long existed in Amer-
ican law as a cause of action for injuries that arise from sales in violation
of criminal statutes.2 6 In the early twentieth century, statutes proscribed
the sale or lease of such products as guns, 27 explosives, 28 and alcohol29 to
individuals not lawfully empowered to possess them. A violation of these
statutes constituted negligence or a breach of duty; third parties injured
by such illegally sold or leased products could recover damages from the
merchants who had conducted the transa'ctions. 30 Today, however, even
23. See infra notes 91-162 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 163-77 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 295-97, 111 N.W. 279, 279-80 (1907)
(defendant negligently sold cartridges, in violation of statute, to 13-year-old boy who recklessly in-
jured plaintiff); Driesse v. Verblaauw, 9 N.J. Misc. 173, 173, 176, 153 A. 388, 388-89, 390 (1931)
(employee negligently sold rifle cartridges, in violation of statute, to 15-year-old boy who killed
friend during horseplay); Neff Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ohio St. 302, 304, 307, 171 N.E.
327, 328, 329 (1930) (defendant's clerk negligently sold shotgun, in violation of statute, to minor
who wounded plaintiffs); Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377, 379, 90 A. 657, 658 (1914) (defendant
storeowner negligently sold 22-caliber rifle and cartridges, in violation of statute, to 1 1-year-old boy
who shot plaintiff in the arm); see also Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers, and
Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1013, 1015 (1983) (post-Civil
War dram shop acts established civil causes of action against liquor vendors for injuries to third
parties resulting from illegal sales of alcohol to minors, habitual drunks, or the obviously
intoxicated).
27. E.g., ARZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(5) (1982) (originally enacted in 1901, statute pros-
cribes "[s]elling or transferring a deadly weapon to a prohibited possessor"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
315 (1987) (originally enacted in 1893, statute proscribes sale of guns and other weapons to minors).
28. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 25-1-1 (1982) (enacted in 1958, statute prohibits sale of blasting
caps to minors); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 148, § 16 (1986) (originally enacted in 1904, statute prohibits
sale of explosives to nonlicensed individuals); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 458(11) (McKinney 1986) (origi-
nally enacted in 1949, statute proscribes sales of explosives to persons under 18 years old).
29. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25,602(a) (West 1987) (originally enacted in 1935, statute
proscribes sales of alcohol to drunks or obviously intoxicated people); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86
(1987) (originally enacted in 1935, statute prohibits sales of alcohol to minors or drunks).
30. See, eg., Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 593 F.2d 526, 529-30 (3d Cir. 1979) (sale of
ammunition in violation of Delaware statute constitutes negligence per se); Holzer, Liability to the
Injured Third Party for Negligent Entrustment of a Firearm, 59 CHi. B. REc. 346, 347 (1978) (know-
ing violation of Illinois gun control statute, which proscribes sale of firearms to designated groups of
individuals, constitutes breach of specific duty and gives rise to cause of action in negligence). In the
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in the absence of statutory proscriptions, courts are creating broad com-
mon law duties for businesses to select appropriate customers.
A. The Expanding Doctrine of "Negligent Entrustment. "
Sections 308 and 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts outline
the tort of "negligent entrustment. ' ' 31 The doctrine of negligent entrust-
ment predates the publication of the first Restatement of T s32 and to-
interest of public safety, courts have recognized that the duty to investigate buyers of inherently
dangerous instrumentalities is a reasonable requirement for doing business. See, e.g., Hetherton v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 652 F.2d 1152, 1160 (3d Cir. 1981) ("As a deterrent to our nation's escalating
violence, certainly a legislature may prohibit the sale of handguns to individuals who have records
... and certainly they can impose substantial civil liability on gun sellers like Sears who breach
statutory obligations.").
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1965). Section 308 of the Restate-
ment (Second), entitled "Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in Activities,"
states:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is
under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends
or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Id. § 308.
Section 390, entitled "Chattel for Use by Person Known to be Incompetent," states:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom
the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or
otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself
and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is
subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
Id. § 390. Section 390 is described as a "special application" of section 308. Id. § 390 comment a.
Courts have repeatedly held that the necessary elements of a negligent entrustment claim
include:
(1) Proof that the entrustee was incompetent, inexperienced or reckless; (2) that the entrus-
tor "knew or had reason to know" of the entrustee's condition or proclivities; (3) that there
was an entrustment of the chattel; (4) that the entrustment created an appreciable risk of
harm to the plaintiff and a relational duty on the part of the defendant; (5) that the harm to
the plaintiff was "proximately" or "legally" caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Woods, Negligent Entrustment. Evaluation of a Frequently Overlooked Source of Additional Liabil-
ity, 20 ARK. L. REv. & B. Ass'N J. 101, 101-02 (1966) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Collins v.
Arkansas Cement Co., 453 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 1972), and in Evans v. Allen Auto Rental &
Truck Leasing, 555 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Mo. 1977); see also Chiniche v. Smith, 374 So. 2d 872, 876
(Ala. 1979) (requiring similar elements); Williams v. Steves Indus., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1985)
(same).
Maryland has generally led in the development of negligent entrustment doctrine, particularly
in the area of motor vehicle torts. See, e.g., Curley v. General Valet Serv., 270 Md. 248, 259-65, 311
A.2d 231, 237-40 (1973) (discussing doctrine's development in Maryland caselaw); Snowhite v.
State, 243 Md. 291, 311-15, 221 A.2d 342, 353-56 (1966) (same); Rounds v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120,
126-27, 177 A. 174, 176-77 (1935) (first case applying doctrine). The doctrine also has strong sup-
port in Alabama. See Keller v. Kiedinger, 389 So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1980) (citing Note, Negligent
Entrustment in Alabama, 23 ALA. L. REv. 733 (1971)).
32. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 117, 75 So. 621, 623 (1917) (mother who
knew of adult son's incompetence may be held liable for permitting him to drive car); Allen v. Bland,
168 S.W. 35, 39-40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (father may be held liable for entrusting automobile to 11-
year-old son); Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 508-11, 134 S.E. 576, 581-82 (1926) (father liable for
entrusting automobile to habitually intoxicated son).
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day affords a civil cause of action in virtually every state.33 The doctrine
allows a third party to recover damages from a party who "entrusts"
goods to a user if the user injures the third party through inexperience or
incompetence in handling the goods. 34 The willingness of some courts to
include virtually any product involved in commercial sales and leases
within the scope of negligent entrustment,35 along with the refusal of
other courts to distinguish between a "user" of a product and a "buyer"
of a product,36 has fostered development of the negligent commercial
transaction tort.37
1. Negligent Entrustment Principles as Applied to Sales and Leases.
It is helpful to think of the negligent commercial transaction doctrine as
a "commercial subset" of the more general doctrine of negligent entrust-
ment. Both torts are associated with sections 308 and 390 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. 38 Their application differs only in that negligent
entrustment usually targets entrusters, such as lenders, donors, or bail-
ors, while the negligent commercial transaction tort targets sellers and
Early court decisions generally interpreted the original Restatement to prevent the imposition of
negligent entrustment liability on sellers. See, eg., Perez v. G & W Chevrolet, Inc., 274 Cal. App.
2d 766, 767-69, 79 Cal. Rptr. 287, 288-90 (1969) (dismissing parents' wrongful death action against
seller of car to unlicensed and inexperienced 19-year-old who killed herself driving two weeks later);
Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967) (dismissing acci-
dent victim's action against service station that sold gasoline to intoxicated driver who injured plain-
tiff and killed four family members in collision); Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1959)
(dismissing father's action against seller of gasoline to 12-year-old son burned when gasoline ignited
during horseplay); Rush v. Smitherman, 294 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (dismissing wrongful
death action against dealer for selling car to unlicensed buyer who killed plaintiffs' father in
collision).
33. Douglas v. Hartford Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 934, 936 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Negligent entrustment
is a common law tort, recognized in virtually every state.").
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1965).
35. Cf Brown v. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 291 Ala. 80, 83, 277 So. 2d 893, 896 (1973) (noting
that "the all-embracing term 'chattels' used in the Restatement is not restricted to automobiles").
36. See, e.g., O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Serv. Station, 202 Cal. App. 3d 151, 247 Cal. Rptr. 663
(ordered not published in California Appellate Reports; opinion appears in California Reporter ad-
vance sheets) ("supply" of gasoline by service station to drunk driver), review denied, [no docket
number] (Cal. Aug. 18, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 200); cf Rush, 294 S.W.2d at 875 (holding
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 390 (1934) inapplicable to automobile buyers).
37. See, e.g., Dillon v. Suburban Motors, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 233, 212 Cal. Rptr. 360 (opin-
ion omitted from California Appellate Reports at California Supreme Court's direction) (recognizing
common law action against dealership that sold car to unlicensed 17-year-old), dismissed as moot,
705 P.2d 1260, 218 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. 1985) (en banc); Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co.,
383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 to uphold injured
construction worker's common law negligence action against company that leased crane to "inexpe-
rienced" customer).
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 390 comment a ("The rule stated applies to anyone who supplies a chattel for the use of another[,]
... (including] sellers, lessors, donors or lenders, and.., all kinds of bailors .... ").
Vol. 1988:755] NEGLIGENT COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 761
lessors.39 In fact, the Restatement (Second) of Torts indiscriminately ap-
plies the doctrine to all "suppliers" of goods, providing no technical defi-
nition of the term "supplier."''4
The substantive difference between the negligent commercial trans-
action and negligent entrustment torts stems from the failure of the first
Restatement of Torts to state explicitly whether sections 308 or 390 ap-
plied to sellers and lessors.41 This omission initially prompted some
courts to interpret the sections conservatively and to exclude merchants
from liability.4 2 Recently, however, the revised language of section 390
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts43 has inspired the development of a
civil cause of action that applies to both sellers and lessors of products.44
2. How Negligent Entrustment Sidesteps Traditional Obstacles to
Recovery. In the past, courts have generally limited the reach of the
negligent entrustment doctrine to cases involving automobiles or inher-
ently dangerous instrumentalities. 45 Today, however, more and more
courts are adopting the view that the doctrine's application "does not
39. Cf Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Home, 505 So. 2d 560, 561-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (distinguishing between negligent loan or bailment situations and negligent sales), aff'd, No.
70,499, slip op. (Fla. Sept. 1, 1988) (westlaw, 1988 WL 93694). Compare Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Abdullah, 94 Cal. App. 3d 81, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1979) (negligent entrustment action
against owner of loaned automobile) with Barsness, 383 N.W.2d at 840 (negligent entrustment action
against lessor of crane).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 comment a.
41. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1934).
42. See, e.g., Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889, 895 (Mo. 1959) (first Restatement's language
does not apply to sale of gasoline to minors); Rush v. Smitherman, 294 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956) (same language does not include sellers of automobiles).
43. See supra notes 31, 38.
44. See, ag., Dillon v. Suburban Motors, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 233, 212 Cal. Rptr. 360 (opin-
ion omitted from California Appellate Reports at California Supreme Court's direction) (cause of
action exists for negligent sale of automobile), dismissed as moot, 705 P.2d 1260, 218 Cal. Rptr. 584
(1985) (en banc); Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986) (cause of
action exists for negligent lease of construction crane); cf. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Home,
505 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("The issue presented on appeal is whether this court
should extend the law of negligent entrustment to include negligent sales."), aff'd, No. 70,499, slip
op. (Fla. Sept. 1, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 93694).
45. Early cases involving entrustment of inherently dangerous instrumentalities include
McEldon v. Drew, 138 Iowa 390, 116 N.W. 147 (1908) (gunpowder sold to 12-year-old boy); Bos-
serman v. Smith, 205 Mo. App. 657, 226 S.W. 608 (1920) (fireworks sold to children); Gerbino v.
Greenhut-Siegel-Cooper Co., 165 A.D. 763, 152 N.Y.S. 502 (1915) (airgun entrusted to minor);
Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377, 90 A. 657 (1914) (rifle sold to 11-year-old boy). See generally 1 J.
DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 23.01 (1982); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 33, at 200, § 73, at 522-24 (5th ed. 1984); Holzer, supra note 30, at 352.
For an example of how courts traditionally treated the issue of negligent entrustment of
automobiles, see Gardiner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 117, 75 So. 621, 623 (1917) (parent may be held
liable for entrusting automobile to reckless adult son); Sanders v. Walden, 214 Ark. 523, 526-27, 217
S.W.2d 357, 359 (1949) (car entrusted to brother, who was four feet, two inches tall); Owens v.
Carmichael's U-Drive Autos, 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931) (car rented to unaccompanied
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depend on the nature of the chattel. '46 These courts argue that the anal-
ysis should focus on the incompetence or inexperience of the user and the
supplier's knowledge of that ineptitude.4 7
Much of the modem popularity of the negligent entrustment doe-
trine-and of the narrower negligent commercial transaction tort-stems
from its usefulness in overcoming well-settled limitations to tort recovery
under workers' compensation statutes4 and the theory of respondeat su-
perior.49 Respondeat superior allows third-party recovery against em-
ployers only when negligent employees act within their "scope of
employment"; only then are employees considered agents of their em-
ployers.50 Workers' compensation statutes likewise allow injured em-
ployees to recover damages against their employers only for "work-
connected injuries. t51 These theories limit recovery to the employment
context, and as a result third parties and employees injured by a negli-
gent employee acting outside the scope of employment normally cannot
recover damages against the employer.5 2
adult possessing only student permit); Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 A.D. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1941)
(upholding action against father for giving car to epileptic son).
46. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 445 n.24, 254 N.W.2d 759, 768 n.24 (1977) (slingshot);
see also Pritchett v. Kimberling Cove, Inc., 568 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1977) (boats), cert denied, 436
U.S. 922 (1978); Brown v. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 291 Ala. 80, 83, 277 So. 2d 893, 896 (1973)
(tools); Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984) (golf carts); Fredericks v. General Motors
Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 311 N.W.2d 725 (1981) (drill-press dies).
47. See, eg., Drummond v. Walker, 643 F. Supp. 190, 191 (D.D.C. 1986); Herbert v. Whittle,
69 Md. App. 273, 279, 517 A.2d 358, 362-68 (1986), cert denied, 309 Md. 49, 522 A.2d 393 (1987);
Fredericks, 411 Mich. at 719, 311 N.W.2d at 727; Denby v. Davis, 212 Va. 836, 838-39, 188 S.E.2d
226, 229 (1972).
48. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text (discussing workers' compensation); see also
Woods, supra note 31, at 120 (suit grounded in negligent entrustment can avoid fatal defenses and
allow for broader admissibility of evidence).
49. The phrase means "let the master answer." The respondeat superior doctrine makes a
master vicariously liable in tort for her servant's wrongful acts that injure third parties. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957); 1 J. DOOLEY, supra note 45, ch. 16; W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, §§ 69-70.
50. See, e.g., Abraham v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 632, 446 P.2d 821, 825 (1968);
McNeill v. Spindler, 191 Va. 685, 694-96, 62 S.E.2d 13, 17-18 (1950); see also Woods, supra note 11,
at 294-99. For an explanation of the limitations of respondeat superior, see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 228 (1957); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, § 70.
51. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.10 (1987).
52. Id.; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, § 70, at 501; see, e-g., Brown v. Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc., 291 Ala. 80, 82, 277 So. 2d 893, 895 (1973) (plaintiff could not recover against employer
of person who struck him in the head with a hammer because complaint did not allege that person
was acting within scope of employment); Mullins v. Harrell, 490 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (employer not liable for truck damage caused by employee because employee was using
truck on personal errand outside scope of employment); cf Collins v. Arkansas Cement Co., 453
F,2d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 1972) ("Since [the employee] admittedly was not within the course of his
employment when he was carousing around on Sunday afternoon and gave the cherry bombs to the
children, the only basis for liability would be on the theory of negligent entrustment.").
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In contrast, a negligent entrustment theory of recovery involves no
issue of agency or employment and thus avoids the "scope of employ-
ment" and "work-connected" tests.5 3 To incur negligent entrustment li-
ability, an employer need only "entrust" a product to an inexperienced
or incompetent employee who later injures a fellow worker or an inno-
cent third party.54 Negligent entrustment thus provides a powerful
means of recovery from a solvent, insured employer for the acts of a
poorly insured employee, irrespective of where or when the accident oc-
curred.5 5 Moreover, recent applications of the theory suggest that the
full potential of negligent entrustment has yet to be realized.5 6
Negligent entrustment theory has proven especially useful to injured
workers who seek to avoid the strictures of workers' compensation stat-
utes.57 The statutes' guarantee of compensation for job-related injuries
53. See, eg., Pritchett v. Kimberly Cove, Inc., 568 F.2d 570, 578 & n.14 (8th Cir. 1977) (em-
ployer held liable for negligently entrusting boat to underage employee despite fact that employee
acted outside scope of employment), cert denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); Collins, 453 F.2d at 513-14
(employer held liable to injured child for entrusting employee with cherry bombs that employee
subsequently gave to children, despite fact that accident and entrustment occurred outside scope of
employement); see also Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171, 177-78 (8th Cir. 1967) (respondeat supe-
rior and negligent entrustment not mutually exclusive; recovery possible under both theories).
54. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text (discussing negligent entrustment generally
and as applied to sales and leases).
55. See, eg., Denby v. Davis, 212 Va. 236, 188 S.E.2d 226 (1972) (suit against employer of 20-
year-old with congenital eye defect who killed child while on unauthorized driving trip). Plaintiffs
have brought suits under similar theories against employers who negligently serve alcohol to employ-
ees at company social functions. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 959, 962 (4th Cir.
1982) (Litton employee drove through red light after company Christmas party, killing plaintiff's
decedent; remanded for trial to determine whether Litton negligently allowed alcohol to be served to
intoxicated employee), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264
Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136, 137 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 88-89,
100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 754-56 (1972) (employee of defendant struck plaintiffs' automobile after under-
age employee became intoxicated at Christmas party; remanded for trial because serving alcohol to
minor is negligence per se); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 459-60, 716 P.2d 814, 818-19
(1986) (employee of defendant, driving after becoming intoxicated at company banquet, struck plain-
tiff; verdict for plaintiff affirmed because employer's agent was in position and had duty to stop
serving intoxicated employee).
56. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Merger Enters., 463 So. 2d 121, 123-28 (Ala. 1984) (negligent en-
trustment theory used by court against liquor vendor after repeal of dram shop statute and before
enactment of tougher version); Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 753-54, 757-58 (Mo. 1984)
(plaintiff recovered largest personal injury verdict in state history, using negligent entrustment the-
ory); Williams v. Steves Indus., 699 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex. 1985) (punitive damages nay be awarded
for grossly negligent entrustment); see also Woods, supra note 11, at 304 (noting weakening of doc-
trine that negligent entrustment is unavailable when respondeat superior is admitted by employer).
57. Statutory compensation for injured workers first appeared in the United States around
1902, when Maryland established an accident fund for employees in certain perilous occupations.
See 1902 Md. Laws ch. 139. But see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, § 80 (describing
New York's 1910 law as first workers' compensation statute). All but eight states had adopted some
form of statutory relief by 1920. Hawaii, in 1963, was the last of the 50 states to enact a workers'
compensation law. I A. LARSON, supra note 51, §§ 5.20, 5.30.
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has been regarded as a victory over common law defenses such as con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk.58 Today, however, tort re-
covery has become easier to obtain, 59 and many workers might well
regret the loss of their common law rights against employers. 60 More
and more often, resourceful workers sue the sellers or lessors of the
equipment involved in industrial accidents in the hope of supplementing
their workers' compensation benefits.61
Workers' compensation benefits are often inadequate because they
are designed to compensate only those injuries that affect earning power;
nonvocational injuries such as pain and suffering and loss of consortium
are ignored. 62 Failure to adjust benefits for inflation and administrative
delay and disagreement over the degree of a worker's impairment also
compound the problem of inadequate recovery in some states.63 These
problems have led to a perception that benefits under the compensation
acts are "not much higher than is necessary to keep the worker from
destitution.'"64
58. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, § 80, at 572-73 (workers' compensation
laws nullified common law defenses that had impeded workers' recovery).
59. The development of the theories of comparative negligence and last clear chance has eroded
the formidable defense of contributory negligence, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45,
§§ 66-67, which often completely barred workers from recovery, see I A. LARSON, supra note 51,
§ 4.30.
60. Cf Problems with Worker's Comp, Chicago Tribune, June 19, 1985, § 1, at 18, col. 3 (Col-
lecting workers' compensation from a recalcitrant employer can be a long, expensive process, taking
about 12 months for arbitrator decisions and as long as 36 months if appealed; as an injured worker
complains, there is nothing guaranteed about workers' compensation's "guaranteed" payments.).
61. Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Stat-
utes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1983)..
62. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 51, § 2.40; see also White v. Chrysler Corp., 421 Mich. 192, 196-
97, 364 N.W.2d 619, 621 (1984) (in action by two workers for injuries to their hands caused by a
power press, court noted that "[u]nless there is... a third person under a legal liability to the injured
worker, he has no source of recovery for loss of the non-vocational use of the hand").
63. See Note, supra note 61, at 1643-44.
64. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 51, § 2.50. Most compensation acts award the worker a percent-
age of his average weekly wage; the type of disability suffered determines the percentage. The award
is subject to a maximum total disbursement limit over a specified number of weeks. Id.; see also
White, 421 Mich. at 206, 364 N.W.2d at 625 ("The absence of tort liability or other reparations for
loss not covered by worker's compensation benefits ... results in the undercompensation of many
seriously injured workers."); Johnson & Heler, Compensation for Death from Asbestos, 37 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 529, 532 tbl. 1 (1984) (study showed that widows of deceased workers recouped
average of 36.2% of lost wages under workers' compensation); Note, supra note 61, at 1645 ("Work-
ers whose injuries are compensable exclusively under workers' compensation can ... be seriously
disadvantaged relative to those with access to tort remedies."); Self-Interest Dominates Worker's
Compensation Debate, L.A. Times, Aug. 13, 1986, § IV, at 1, col. 2 (state legislature debates whether
to raise maximum benefits for workers with short-term disabilities from "ridiculously low" $224 per
week to $800 per week).
Congress has noted the problem of undercompensation for workers. In 1979, legislation was
proposed in response to a perception that many existing state statutes did not provide "adequate,
prompt and equitable" systems of compensation for workers injured in the course of their employ-
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To illustrate a typical situation in which an injured worker might
bring a negligent commercial transaction suit against a merchant, con-
sider the following example:
Worker W is employed as a laborer at a construction site
by employer E. E recently purchased a construction crane
from business B. B had recommended the particular
model that E purchased because E had stated her need for
equipment with simple operating procedures. E, in fact,
had mentioned to B that her crews were inexperienced.
Shortly after the sale, W is permanently paralyzed in a
crane accident. The state industrial commission awards W
statutory workers' compensation benefits amounting to
66.66% of W's average weekly wage for 450 weeks. Both
W and his attorney consider this relief minimal in compar-
ison to today's million dollar tort recoveries. The state
workers' compensation act, however, bars W and his de-
pendents from suing E. How can W's attorney find more
compensation for his client's injuries? Is there a legal basis
for recovery against B based on B's awareness that E's
crane crew was inexperienced? 65
Although the purpose of all workers' compensation acts is to give
injured employees an exclusive remedy 66 against their employers without
the need for litigation on the issue of fault,67 the exclusive remedy rule
ment. H.R. 5482, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(6) (1979), reprinted in National Workers' Compensa-
tion Standards Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 5482 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1980).
65. This example derives from Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D.
1986), and North Dakota's workers' compensation statutes, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-09, 65-05-
12 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
66. In an action by an employee or his dependents, the exclusivity rule of workers' compensa-
tion remedies generally insulates the employer from common law and statutory tort liability, as well
as liability that may arise in contract or admiralty. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 769 F.2d
1451, 1467 (10th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's claim for decedent's personal injuries from plutonium con-
tamination barred under exclusivity rule of Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, but punitive
damages allowed), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986); U.S. Borax & Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court,
167 Cal. App. 3d 406, 410, 213 Cal. Rptr. 155, 157 (1985) (wrongful death action against employer
arising out of industrial accident barred by exclusivity rule); Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 309,
715 P.2d 978, 979 (claim for damages allegedly incurred in scope of employment barred by exclusive
remedy provision of Idaho's compensation statutes), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 907 (1986); see also 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 51, §§ 65.00, 65.11. One exception to the rule arises if the employer commits an
intentional tort against his employee. Id. §§ 68.00, 68.11.
67. Early court challenges to compensation statutes found the principle of liability without fault
to be an unconstitutional taking of employers' property without due process of law. See Ives v.
South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 294, 94 N.E. 431, 439 (1911), overruled, Montgomery v.
Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1979). Professor Larson has noted that the
fear of unconstitutionality forced legislatures "to pass over the ideal type of coverage, which would
have been both comprehensive and compulsory." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 51, § 5.20, at 38. Under
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does not apply to employee actions against a third party or "ultimate
wrongdoer. ' 68 A common law negligent commercial transaction suit
may thus avoid statutory restrictions and allow an injured worker to re-
cover damages from merchants outside the employment relationship.69
A merchant doing business with an employer may thus be exposed to
greater potential liability than the employer.70
B. Dram Shop Liability as a Precedent for the Negligent Commercial
Transaction Tort.
The idea that judges can create a right of action to give relief to
undercompensated third parties for injuries resulting from the sale of a
nondefective product is not new. Indeed, judge-made liability for
merchants who do business with incompetent or inexperienced clients
already exists under the doctrine of "dram shop" liability.71
Originally established by statute in the nineteenth century,72 dram
shop liability is the potential civil liability of liquor vendors to third par-
ties for injuries caused by intoxicated or underage patrons.73 Most of the
early dram shop statutes were repealed or fell into disuse immediately
the eventual compromise, employers accepted workers' compensation coverage in exchange for relief
from the risk of large tort verdicts. Cf Bradford Elec. Light v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932)
(Brandeis, J.) (purpose of workers' compensation laws in most states is to provide "not only for
employees a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for em-
ployers a liability which is limited and determinate"); accord Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220,
222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957) (exclusivity of remedy is keystone of worker's
compensation law).
68. See, eg., Burk v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 266 F.2d 433, 435 (10th Cir. 1959) (Oklahoma's
workers' compensation act preserves common law remedies against third-party tortfeasors); Bow-
man v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab, 173 F. Supp. 282, 285 (N.D. Fla. 1959) (workers' compensation
does not preclude common law action against parties outside employer-employee relationship); Price
v. King, 259 Iowa 921, 924, 146 N.W.2d 328, 329 (1966) ("[Tlhe [compensation] act does not deny
an employee the common law right to recover damages caused by the negligence of a third person
even though he has received workmen's compensation benefits for the same injury."). See generally
2A A. LARSON, supra note 51, §§ 67.21, 71.00, 71.10; Birnbaum & Wrubel, Workers' Compensation
and the Employer's Immunity Shield: Recent Exceptions to Exclusivity, 5 J. PROD. LIAB. 119 (1982).
69. See, e.g., Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (injured worker sues
railroad engine lessor); Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986)
(injured worker sues construction crane lessor).
70. For example, in Fowler, 673 S.W.2d at 757-58, a worker won a $6 million verdict from .a
merchant, a sum far in excess of any state's employer-financed workers' compensation benefits.
71. Dram shops were nineteenth-century establishments that sold alcoholic beverages by a unit
of measure called a "dram." Colman, Krell & Mosher, Preventing Alcohol-Related Injuries: Dram
Shop Liability in a Public Health Perspective, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV. 417, 443 n.1 (1985).
72. Wisconsin passed the first dram shop law in 1849. The law required tavern owners to post
a bond to pay civil or criminal judgments against them for illegal sales of alcohol. By the mid-1870s,
11 states had passed dram shop acts. Goldberg, One for the Road: Liquor Liability Broadens,
A.B.A. J., June 1987, at 84, 86.
73. Comment, supra note 26, at 1015.
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following Prohibition;74 further, in jurisdictions where no dram shop
statute was in force, courts generally did not impose liability.75 Today,
however, courts have increasingly rejected this position. 76
Since about 1970, dram shop liability has reemerged at a dramatic
pace, coincident with society's increased concern for drunk driving and
its victims. 77 Thirty states currently have some kind of dram shop act.78
74. See, eg., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 500 233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968);
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 200-01, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959). See generally Colman, Krell &
Mosher, supra note 71, at 443.
75. See, eg., Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 375-76, 720 P.2d 1093, 1100 (1986);
see also Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983) (en banc) (stating and
rejecting traditional rule of nonliability); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Ky. 1968) (acknowl-
edging general rule of nonliability but declining to apply it in all circumstances). The traditional rule
of nonliability stemmed from three principal sources:
(1) the presumption that consumption, and not the sale, of the alcoholic beverage is the
proximate cause of injuries sustained; (2) traditional social mores, dating back to Prohibi-
tion, which hold the drinker morally and legally liable for his own actions; and (3) the
constitutional doctrine that courts should defer questions of liability to the legislature.
Colman, Krell & Mosher, supra note 71, at 419; see also Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va.
350, 353-54, 350 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (1986) (reaffirming Virginia's traditional common law rule of
nonliability).
76. The seminal case rejecting the traditional common law rule of nonliability and adopting a
new judge-made rule is Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10.
77. See generally Rinden, Judicial Prohibition? Erosion of the Common Law Rule of Non-Lia-
bility for Those Who Dispense Alcohol, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 937, 937-40 (1985-1986); cf PRESIDEN-
TIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1 (1983) (estimating that, over 10-year period,
50% of all U.S. highway fatalities involved alcohol, resulting in 250,000 American deaths and a $21
billion annual economic loss).
This recent expansion of dram shop liability has been a welcome source of additional compensa-
tion for injured plaintiffs. Formerly, a plaintiff harmed by an intoxicated tortfeasor could recover
only against that tortfeasor, who may or may not have been adequately insured. See, e.g., Olsen v.
Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 491, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181-82 (1979) ("The problem presented by this
issue is not one of adequate remedies for an injured plaintiff. There seems to be little reason to
provide the person injured by an intoxicated driver with a deeper pocket than the person injured by
the stupid driver, the careless driver or the drugged driver."), overruled, Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis.
2d 627, 646-48, 350 N.W.2d 108, 117-19 (1984); Fugate v. Galvin, 84 Ill. App. 3d 573, 577, 406
N.E.2d 19, 22 (1980) ("The fortuitous circumstance of one driver's inability to pay for damages he
has caused should not be a reason to open new arenas of liability in search of perfect compensation
schemes."). In today's liquor liability cases, however, plaintiffs may extract many times more in
monetary damages from tavern owners than from individual drunk drivers. In Michigan, for exam-
ple, a tavern's insurance company settled a wrongful death claim for over $7 million (not in present
value terms). Cansler v. Pine Knob Invest. Co., No. 84-275551-NI (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County,
settled Oct. 25, 1985). Similarly, in Ohio, widows of two decedents killed by a drunk tavern patron
sued the tavern for $24 million. Hargraves v. Brown, No. CV85-09-1043 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Butler
County, fled Sept. 25, 1985). Not surprisingly, the estimated annual growth rate for alcohol-server
liability litigation is now approaching 300%. Goldberg, supra note 72, at 84.
78. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-70, -71 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4-311, -312 (Supp. 1986-1987); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25,602.1 (West Supp. 1988);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-46-112.5 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West Supp.
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982); IDAHO
CODE § 23-808 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1988); IND.
CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West 1987); ME.
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The courts of ten other states and the District of Columbia, inspired by
the national trend, have created dram shop liability by judicial decree.79
Only ten states fail to give injured plaintiffs a statutory or judge-made
cause of action against those who sell alcohol to underage or intoxicated
tortfeasors.80
Judicial development of dram shop liability in the absence of an ap-
plicable statute typically involves a process in which a court identifies a
social problem, notes the legislature's failure to act, and then uses the
common law to fashion a solution. For example, the dramatic shift in
legislative and judicial opinion on dram shop liability stems from the
spread of alcohol-related accidents on American roads.81 Courts have
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 2501-19 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West
Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053
(Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-710 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-F:1 to -F:8
(Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKin-
ney 1978 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-120 to -129 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-
06.1 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01-.09 (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30.950-.960 (Butterworth 1988 Repl.); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 474497 (Purdon 1969 &
Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-14-1 to -15 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-1 to -2
(1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.035 (West Supp.
1987); Wyo. STAT. §§ 12-5-502, 12-8-301 (1986).
Maine and Rhode Island have recently passed laws patterned after the Model Dram Shop Act,
sometimes called the Liquor Liability Act. Authored by the Prevention Research Group under a
federal grant, the Model Act appears in Colman, Krell & Mosher, supra note 71, at 442.
Many of the the 30 states that now have statutory dram shop liability recognized a common law
cause of action before they adopted dram shop statutes. See, eg., Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500,
513, 667 P.2d 200, 213 (1983); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 621, 619 P.2d 135, 139 (1980);
Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627,
646, 350 N.W.2d 108, 115-17 (1984).
79." See Rong You Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268 (D.C. 1987); Ono v.
Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 138, 612 P.2d 533, 537-38 (1980); Pike, 434 S.W.2d at 629; Chausse v.
Southland Corp., 400 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (La. Ct. App.), cert. and review denied, 404 So. 2d 278 (La.
1981); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 501, 233 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1968); Munford, Inc. v.
Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213, 217 (Miss. 1979); Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 9-10; Brigance
v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla. 1986); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App.
656, 665, 393 S.W.2d 755, 759 (1964) (dicta); Poole v. El Chico Corp., 713 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986), aff'd, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 658-60,
663 P.2d 834, 837-38, amended, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983).
80. Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, and Virginia continue to follow the common law rule of
nonliability for alcohol sellers. See Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981) (no dram shop
liability); Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986) (no dram shop liability
recognized); Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981) (no civil liability under statute
proscribing sales to intoxicated persons); Williamson v. The Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 350
S.E.2d 621 (1986). South Dakota has provided statutory civil immunity. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 354-78, 35-11-1 (1986 Rev. & Supp. 1988). To date, there are no cases or statutes address-
ing dram shop liability in Arkansas, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina or West Virginia.
81. See Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 507, 667 P.2d at 207 (common law rule of nonliability for tavern
owners anachronistic in view of "frightful toll" of alcohol-related traffic fatalities and injuries);
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 77, at 11; cf Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J.
538, 545-46 & n.3, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 & n.3 (1984) (noting huge cost to state of alcohol-related
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noted the problem of inadequate compensation for victims of such acci-
dents, and where legislatures have failed to confront this problem, some
courts have been inspired to take judicial action.8 2
In support of its action to abrogate the rule of nonliability, such a
court could argue that: (1) dram shop liability is analogous to liability
for negligent entrustment of firearms or automobiles to minors, intoxi-
cated persons, and incompetents;83 (2) the national trend toward dram
shop liability should give suppliers of alcohol fair notice to carry ade-
quate liability insurance;8 4 and (3) there is a pressing need to compensate
the innocent victims of alcohol-related accidents.85 Based on these argu-
ments, the court could claim that the rule of nonliability is "an anachro-
nism, unsuitable to our present society, and... repugnant to modem tort
personal injuries and property damage, estimated at $1,149,516,000 for 1978-1982, as a factor in
favor of imposing liability on hosts for injuries caused by intoxicated guests).
When most people walked and few had horses or carriages, or even in the days when the
horse and buggy was a customary mode of travel, it may have been that the common law
rule of law of non-liability arising from the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person was
satisfactory. But the situation then and the problem in today's society of the imbiber going
upon the public highways and operating a machine that requires quick response of mind
and muscle and capable of producing mass death and destruction are vastly different.
Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 400, 462 P.2d 54, 65 (1969) (Prather, J., concurring specially in
result and dissenting in part), overruled, Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 621, 619 P.2d 135, 139
(1980). In his Meade dissent, Judge Prather argued in favor of a common law cause of action. See
id at 395-403, 462 P.2d at 60-68. The Idaho Supreme Court overruled Meade "to the extent that it
infers that under common-law rule and present statutes the vending of intoxicants can never be the
proximate cause of damage to third parties resulting from the tortious or unlawful acts of the con-
sumer." Alegria, 101 Idaho at 621, 619 P.2d at 139 (emphasis in original).
82. E.g., Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 303 (Okla. 1986) ("Because
the Legislature has failed to act to impose civil liability, for reasons unknown, does not unequivo-
cally demonstrate legislative intent."); Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 512, 667 P.2d at 212 ("The legislature
may well believe that when a judge-made common law rule has become obsolescent, anachronistic
and unjust, the responsibility for change is ours, not theirs.").
83. See Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 516, 667 P.2d 213, 216 (1983); Ontiveros, 136
Aiz. at 509, 667 P.2d at 209 (citing seminal case involving negligent sale of automobile, Johnson v.
Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1961)); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973,
Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 631, 198 A.2d 550, 553 (1964) (serving alcohol to intoxicated patron with car akin
to entrusting demented individual with gun); cf. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 549, 476 A.2d at 1224-25 (social
host's liability for serving intoxicated guest analogous to car owner's liability for lending car to
intoxicated person).
84. See, eg., Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 350 N.W.2d 108, 118 (1984). Presum-
ably, vendors would pass the costs of additional insurance on to their customers.
85. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 205, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959) ("[R]ecognition of the
plaintiff's claim will afford a fairer measure of justice to innocent third parties whose injuries are
brought about by the unlawful and negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to minors and intoxicated
persons .... ); PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 77, at 11 (recommending
dram shop liability as way to reduce number of accidents); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A,
§ 2502(2)(A) (Supp. 1987) (secondary purpose of Maine's Liquor Liability Act is to "[e]stablish a
legal basis for obtaining compensation for those suffering damages as a result of intoxication-related
incidents in accordance with this Act").
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theories."' 86 The court could then decide that it can no longer "escape
responsibility behind the hoary doctrine of stare decisis,"87 and it could
rationalize that its abrogation of the rule of nonliability is not judicial
legislation by asserting:
The common law, which is judge-made and judge-applied, can and will
be changed when changed conditions and circumstances establish that
it is unjust or has become bad public policy. In reevaluating previous
decisions in light of present facts and circumstances, we do not depart
from the proper role of the judiciary.88
Several state legislatures have reacted with alarm to such assertions
and to the courts' increased willingness to engineer solutions to social
problems. In the case of dram shop liability, for example, some legisla-
tures have overturned court decisions or clarified the limits of liability
under existing dram shop acts. 9 These lawmakers have sought to re-
strain the judiciary from expanding common law liability too far, or to
interdict the new judge-made rules before they become too entrenched. 90
The growth of the judge-made negligent commercial transaction doc-
trine, however, has yet to draw a rebuke from state legislatures.
III. NEGLIGENT COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION CASELAW
Today, some state courts no longer recognize any real distinction
between merchants who violate statutory duties by selling alcohol or
weapons to certain classes of individuals and merchants who sell or lease
equipment to inexperienced or incompetent users without violating any
86. Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 570, 596 P.2d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 1979), overruled, Ontiveros,
136 Ariz. at 507-08, 667 P.2d at 207-08.
87. Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 401, 462 P.2d 54, 66 (1969) (Prather, L, concurring
specially in result, dissenting in part), overruled, Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 621, 619 P.2d
135, 139 (1980).
88. Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 504, 667 P.2d at 204.
89. See, eg., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25,602(c), 25,602.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (abro-
gating Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859
(1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), and providing civil
immunity to commercial vendors, except in the case of sales to obviously intoxicated minors); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (Vernon 1988) (abrogating Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Sampson v. W.F.
Enter., Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), and providing civil immunity to commercial
vendors, except in cases of sales to minors or obviously intoxicated persons); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 35-4-78, -11-1 (1986 Rev. & Supp. 1988) (abrogating Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d
120 (S.D. 1982), and providing corfplete civil immunity to commercial vendors).
90. Some courts that have held hosts liable for their drunken guests' torts have also faced legis-
lative abrogation of their decisions. See, eg., Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 538, abrogated by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25,602(c) (West 1985); Wiener v. Gamma
Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 643, 485 P.2d 18, 23 (1971), limited by
1979 Or. Laws ch. 801, § 2, repealed by 1987 Or. Laws ch. 774, § 14.
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statutory duty. Inspired by the revision of section 390 in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the recent trends in common law dram shop liability,
and the notion that the judiciary can alleviate social problems through
expanded tort liability, courts in Alaska,91 California, 92 Missouri,93 and
North Dakota94 have recognized a new common law cause of action
against merchants. Under this new rule, a sale or lease of goods to a
customer who the merchant knows or should know is inexperienced or
incompetent establishes a prima facie case of negligence against the
merchant in favor of third parties injured through the customer's use of
the product. 95 The future of this cause of action is unclear. Although
most of the current caselaw involves automobile sales to incompetent
drivers, 96 the doctrine has been successfully applied in other contexts as
well. 97 So far, only Florida has explicitly rejected the trend, noting the
adverse commercial impact of the new action.98
A. Commercial Leases.
Where leases are concerned, courts have traditionally limited the
doctrine of negligent commercial transactions to cases involving car rent-
als to unlicensed or intoxicated drivers.99 Two courts, however, have
recently found this approach too restrictive and have extended the doc-
trine to commercial leases involving products other than autos.
First, in Barsness v. General Diesel & Equipment Co., 100 the
Supreme Court of North Dakota unanimously recognized a right of ac-
tion against a construction crane lessor based on evidence that the lessee,
who was the plaintiff's employer, may have had limited experience in
91. See Flieger v. Barcia, 674 P.2d 299, 301 (Alaska 1983) (owner of vehicle may become liable
for negligent entrustment by selling vehicle to another).
92. See O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Serv. Station, 202 Cal. App. 3d 151, 247 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669-
71 (ordered not published in California Appellate Reports; opinion appears in California Reporter
advance sheets), review denied, [no docket number] (Cal. Aug. 18, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 Cal. LEXIS
220); Johnson v. Casetta, 197 Cal. App. 2d 272, 274-75, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81, 82-83 (1961).
93. See Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 753-54 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
94. See Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 845-46 (N.D. 1986).
95. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
98. See Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Home, 505 So. 2d 560, 562, 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (en bane), aff'd, No. 70,499, slip op. (Fla. Sept. 1, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 93694); see also
Jackson v. Turnipseed, 512 So. 2d 213, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam). A few states
have refused to extend liability to sellers of automobiles, reasoning that such sales are simply outside
the proper scope of negligent entrustment. See, eg., Tosh v. Scott, 129 Ill. App. 3d 322, 472 N.E.2d
591 (1984); Kirk v. Miller, 7 Kan. App. 2d 504, 644 P.2d 486 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Autos, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 348, 350-51, 2 P.2d
580, 581 (1931) (action against rental agent for leasing car to unlicensed driver).
100. 383 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1986).
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operating such cranes. The plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured
after a manbasket in which he was riding tumbled thirty-five feet to the
ground. Both parties stipulated that the manbasket had been negligently
rigged. The injured worker sought recovery based on negligent entrust-
ment, to which the court replied, "we see no reason why the doctrine
should not apply to... chattels [other than automobiles] which, if placed
in the hands of an incompetent or inexperienced person, present a likeli-
hood of unreasonable risk of harm to third persons."10 1 Despite the fact
that the plaintiff's employer had previously leased a crane from the lessor
without incident, the court held, on motion for summary judgment, that
there existed a genuine issue of fact concerning the employer's experience
with cranes and that the action should proceed to trial. 102
Second, in Fowler v. Park Corp., 10 3 a divided Missouri Supreme
Court relied on section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in af-
firming a six-million-dollar judgment in a negligence action. The case
involved a corporate defendant that had leased part of an industrial park
to the employer of the plaintiff, a nineteen-year-old sandblaster. The
park contained a railroad engine, and during night shifts, the plaintiff's
fellow employees customarily used the engine to conduct switching oper-
ations for the entire yard. These employees lacked formal instruction or
training in switching, in the operation of engines, and in general safety
procedures;104 the employees' inexperience with the engine led to an acci-
dent that cost the plaintiff both his legs. In upholding the plaintiff's ac-
tion against the lessor-defendant, the Missouri Supreme Court declared
that the lessor "had a duty to make sure that [the lessee-employer] al-
lowed only competent persons to operate [the engine]."' 05 Noting the
young worker's pitiful physical condition, the court affirmed the largest
personal injury verdict ever awarded in Missouri. t0 6
B. Common Law Negligent Sales.
For years, California stood alone in recognizing a common law ac-
tion for the negligent sale of a non-alcoholic, nonlethal product. 0 7 The
seminal 1961 California case, Johnson v. Casetta, 108 involved the negli-
gent sale of an automobile to an incompetent driver. Later cases, such as
101. Id. at 842.
102. Id. at 845.
103. 673 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
104. Id. at 751.
105. Id. at 753.
106. Id. at 757-58.
107. Cf supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (noting traditional focus of negligent commer-
cial transaction doctrine on sales of alcohol and weapons in violation of statutes).
108. 197 Cal. App. 2d 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1961).
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Roland v. Golden Bay Chevrolet'0 9 and Dillon v. Suburban Motors,
Inc., ' 10 reaffirmed California's commitment to providing a remedy for
third parties injured by negligently sold automobiles."' These cases cre-
ated the rule that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of negligence
by presenting evidence that an automobile seller knew or should have
known that the buyer who injured the plaintiff was an incompetent
driver.
In Johnson, the plaintiff brought an action based on section 390 of
the first Restatement of Torts against a used-car dealer for the wrongful
death of their son and for other personal injuries." 2 In that case, the car
dealership had sold an automobile to a non-English-speaking native of
Mexico. Some weeks after the sale, the car buyer swerved across a center
line and into the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle. The plaintiffs asserted that
the buyer had virtually no driving experience and that the seller knew or
should have known that the buyer was an incompetent driver."t 3 The
Johnson court, relying principally on section 390 of the first Restatement
of Torts and on negligent entrustment cases involving loaned
automobiles, held that the plaintiffs could have established a cause of
action against the seller of the automobile had they offered sufficient
proof of their assertions." 4
The Roland v. Golden Bay Chevrolet court cited Johnson in holding
that a third party established a prima facie case of negligence against a
car seller for injuries inflicted by a buyer's vehicle.'1 5 The court admitted
that car sellers have no duty to investigate a buyer's license,'1 6 but held
that if circumstances that alert a seller to a buyer's unlicensed status (and
therefore his incompetence) fortuitously arise and the seller nevertheless
109. 161 Cal. App. 3d 102, 207 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1984) (opinion omitted from California Appellate
Reports), dismissed as moot, 704 P.2d 175, 217 Cal. Rptr. 415 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
110. 166 Cal. App. 3d 233, 212 Cal. Rptr. 360 (opinion omitted from California Appellate Re-
ports at California Supreme Court's direction), dismissed as moot, 705 P.2d 1260, 218 Cal. Rptr. 584
(Cal. 1985) (en bane).
111. The California courts have been willing to recognize common law liability for negligent
sales under Johnson and section 390 of the Restatement (Second) only for injuries to third persons.
They have not been willing to grant a right of action to the estate of an unlicensed, injured buyer
who, through her own negligence, kills herself. See Perez v. G & W Chevrolet, Inc., 274 Cal. App.
2d 766, 79 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1969). Other states have taken the position that the sale of automobiles is
simply beyond the scope of negligent entrustment doctrine. See supra note 98.
112. 197 Cal. App. 2d at 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
113. Id. at 272-74, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
114. See id. at 276, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 83; cf supra note 45 (discussing negligent entrustment cases
that involve entrustment-as opposed to sale-of automobiles and other dangerous instrumentalities
by an owner to an incompetent).
115. Roland v. Golden Bay Chevrolet, 161 Cal. App. 3d 102, 207 Cal. Rptr. 413, 417-19 (1984)
(opinion omitted from California Appellate Reports), dismissed as moot, 704 P.2d 175, 217 Cal. Rptr.
415 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
116. 207 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
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completes the sale, then a third party injured as a result of the buyer's
incompetence as a driver has a cause of action. 117 The court noted that
Golden Bay's customary business practice included checking licenses and
that the dealership claimed to have seen the buyer's license. 118 As it
turned out, the buyer had nothing but a passport. 119
Dillon v. Suburban Motors, Inc. 120 expanded Roland by effectively
imposing a duty on automobile sellers to demand that patrons produce a
driver's license as evidence of their competence to drive121 and, if possi-
ble, to "unwind" financing deals and "retake possession" of vehicles
should evidence of a buyer's incompetence later arise. 122 In Dillon, a
mother and son, both of whom held valid Missouri licenses, jointly
purchased an automobile in California. The dealer knew that the minor
son would operate the car about twenty-five percent of the time. The
son, while speeding, caused an accident that killed three people and in-
jured nine others. The injured plaintiffs sought to prove that the minor
had failed California's written driver's examination and that the dealer
had knowledge of this failure. The court noted that Suburban had vio-
lated its own financing procedures by delivering possession before the
purchasers had obtained California licenses. It also noted that California
law requires minors from other states who intend to drive to obtain Cali-
fornia licenses within ten days after they establish state residency. At no
time did Suburban attempt to ascertain whether the buyers were legal
residents of California. 123 The court determined that Suburban should
have discovered the minor's incompetence and held that Suburban's con-
duct gave rise to a cause of action. 124
The Dillon court seemed unimpressed by the fact that the financing
agreement for the car in question apparently named only the mother, or
117. Id. at 418-19.
118. Id. at 418.
119. Id. at 415-16.
120. 166 Cal. App. 3d 233, 212 Cal. Rptr. 360 (opinion omitted from California Appellate Re-
ports at California Supreme Court's direction), dismissed as moot, 705 P.2d 1260, 218 Cal. Rptr. 584
(Cal. 1985) (en banc).
121. 212 Cal. Rptr. at 369. Relying on Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Abdullah, 94 Cal.
App. 3d 81, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1979), the Dillon court stated that car dealers who sell large num-
bers of cars must take "adequate precautions" to protect the public from harm, such as "requiring
the production of evidence from a prospective user of competency to drive." 212 Cal. Rptr. at 369
(quoting Abdullah, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 262). The Abdullah case, however, is
distinguishable from Dillon. In Abdullah, a used-car dealer entrusted an automobile to an individual
for a test drive without first checking to see that the driver was licensed. The driver failed to return
the car and, two days later, while driving the car, caused a collision that seriously injured third
parties. The test driver lacked a valid license.
122. Dillon, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
123. Id. at 363-64, 366.
124. Id. at 367.
[Vol. 1988:755
Vol. 1988:755] NEGLIGENT COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 775
by evidence indicating that the mother intended to use the vehicle sev-
enty-five percent of the time.125 Dillon seems to support the proposition
that any knowledge on the part of a dealer that an unqualified driver
intends to take part in the purchase and use of a vehicle creates a duty to
avoid the transaction altogether.
California's tort of negligent sales has targeted other goods as
well. 126 Until very recently, suits outside the auto sales context have
failed in California not because one can negligently sell only automobiles,
but because no plaintiff injured by a different product has been able to
prove the elements necessary to establish liability. 127 For example, in
Henderson Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, a plaintiff brought an action
against a merchant after a tar kettle exploded during a roofing job and
damaged a nearby warehouse.'2 8 The court held that the action based on
section 390 failed because the buyer was a licensed, experienced roofer
and a prior owner of tar kettles. 29
In O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Service Station, a California appellate
court recently recognized a common law action against a seller for negli-
gently selling (nondefective) gasoline to an incompetent, intoxicated
driver. 130 O'Toole is the first California case in which a plaintiff success-
fully stated a common law cause of action for the negligent sale of a
product other than an automobile.131
The facts of O'Toole evoke sympathy for the plaintiffs, children of a
victim struck and killed by an intoxicated purchaser, and anger toward
the merchant. Late one night, an obviously intoxicated woman drove
into a Shell station, seeking to buy gasoline. The station's employees
gave the woman several cups of coffee over the course of an hour and a
125. See id at 362-63 (mother, seeking to finance car under her name, indicated to Suburban
Motors manager that her son would use. car 25% of time).
126. See, eg., Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875
(1981) (tar kettle); Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967)
(gasoline).
127. For a discussion of the elements of a common law negligent sale action, see supra text
accompanying note 7. In Fuller, the court refused to hold a vendor liable under section 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts for selling gasoline to an intoxicated driver because, at that time in
California, one could not be held liable even for selling alcohol to an intoxicated driver. Fuller, 250
Cal. App. 2d at 690, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
128. 120 Cal. App. 3d at 908, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
129. Id. at 919-20, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
130. 202 Cal. App. 3d 151, 247 Cal. Rptr. 663 (ordered not published in California Appellate
Reports; opinion appears in California Reporter advance sheets), review denied [no docket number]
(Cal. Aug. 18, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 Cal. LEXIS 220). The court of appeal reversed a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded for jury trial. 247 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
131. Two months after this important decision, pursuant to CAL. R. Cr. 976, the court of appeal
directed that its June 6, 1988, opinion not be published. The court's order appears at 1988 Cal. App.
LEXIS 515.
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half. They gave her money to call her mother for a ride and encouraged
her not to drive. Nevertheless, the employees sold her gasoline, violating
Shell's own policy with respect to drunk drivers. The inebriated woman
ignored the employees' advice, proceeded to drive, and collided with a
motorcycle, killing its driver and passenger. 132
The O'Toole court reasoned that a negligent sale of gasoline, the
motive power of an automobile, to an obviously intoxicated driver is in-
distinguishable from providing alcohol to a drunk driver. 133 Concern
with preventing drunk driving compelled the conclusion that the sta-
tion's sale of gasoline to an intoxicated driver was negligent. 134 More-
over, the court noted, section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
supports the proposition that supplying gasoline to an intoxicated driver
is factually equivalent to giving her the car keys.' 35 The court failed to
recognize that selling goods is substantially different from loaning them.
Instead, the court focused on the merchant's "supplying" the intoxicated
driver with gasoline.' 36
IV. THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE-MADE TORT LIABILITY FOR
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
A. The Doctrine's Rejection in Florida.
A Florida appellate court, in Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Home, 137 recently became the first to recognize that the expansion of
common law liability for negligent commercial transactions could pres-
ent serious problems for American business. The court also expressly
considered whether the theory of negligent entrustment should include a
common law action for negligent sales of any product.' 38 Home, more-
over, is the only case to advance economic arguments 39 in rejecting a
132. O'Toole, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
133. Id. at 669, 671. Framing the argument in this manner, the court easily distinguished Fuller
v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967), which held that furnish-
ing gasoline to an intoxicated driver did not give rise to a cause of action because furnishing even
alcohol to such a driver would not support a cause of action under California law at that time.
O'Toole, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66. The law in California on serving alcohol to intoxicated drivers
has since changed, however. See id. at 666-67.
134. 247 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
135. Id. at 669.
136. Id. at 670.
137. 505 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, No. 70,499, slip op. (Fla. Sept. 1,
1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 93694).
138. Id. at 561. For a recent discussion of the appellate court decision, see Note, Who's Driving,
Anyway?: The Status of Negligent Entrustment in Florida After Home v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet,
Inc., 12 NOVA L. REV. 939 (1988).
139. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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negligent sales claim against a merchant. 140
On its own motion for rehearing en banc in view of the case's excep-
tional importance, the Florida District Court of Appeal withdrew a panel
decision affirming a judgment of $195,000 for an injured plaintiff,14 and
certified the following, yet-to-be-answered, 142 question to the Supreme
Court of Florida:
SHOULD FLORIDA ADOPT SECTION 390 OF THE RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS AND, IF SO,
SHOULD THE SECTION BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO EXTEND
LIABILITY TO A SELLER OF A CHATTEL AS WELL?14 3
Home involved a young woman with a restricted driver's license
who wanted to purchase an automobile. The license required that the
woman drive only in the company of a licensed driver.44 The plaintiff, a
friend of the buyer, happened to be in the car lot at the time of the
purchase and agreed to accompany the buyer out of the lot, although she
had never driven with the buyer previously. During an earlier test-drive,
the buyer had had difficulty in handling the car; at one point, a salesman
had to grab the wheel to avoid hitting a bus. The salesman later pre-
dicted to a fellow employee that the buyer would cause an accident
before she drove one block.' 45 His prediction proved accurate. About
one mile from the dealership, the buyer lost control of the car and hit a
tree, injuring the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued the dealership for negligently selling an automo-
bile to a driver whom the dealership knew to be incompetent. She ar-
gued, in short, "that sellers have a duty to protect the world against
incompetent product users."' 146 The full court rejected this assertion,
holding that the dealership had complied with state law by ensuring that
a licensed driver accompanied the buyer from the lot.' 47 The court con-
140. 505 So. 2d at 563.
141. 505 So. 2d at 561.
142. The Florida Supreme Court declined to address the broad question certified by the appellate
court majority, choosing instead to address the much narrower question offered by the dissent:
IS A SELLER OF AN AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENT UNDER SECTION 390 OF RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1966) WHEN IT KNOWINGLY SELLS A CAR
TO A DRIVER WHO, AFTER DEMONSTRATING DRIVING INCOMPETENCE,
NEVERTHELESS INTENDS TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE?
Home, No. 70,499, slip op. at 2 & n.1.
143. 505 So. 2d at 563-64. The court suggested that "if the law is to be extended to include
liability for negligent sales, it is for the supreme court or the legislature to do it." Id. at 562.
144. Id. at 561. The purchaser's license was restricted because she had failed the driving part of
the license exam. Id. at 564 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 564.
146. Id. at 562.
147. Id. at 563; see also id. ("The fact that ... the salesman[ ] thought [the customer] was less
than competent is simply not relevant.").
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cluded that it is for the state, not merchants, to determine who is quali-
fied to drive, 148 and that a "seller cannot be held liable for harm caused
by a 'defective' customer."1"49
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's decision
and answered a rephrased certified question in the negative.150 The
Supreme Court narrowed the question "of great public importance" to
the facts of the case and held that a seller of an automobile cannot be
held liable under section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 151
The Court relied on three arguments. First, it would be practically im-
possible to confine the negligent sale cause of action "to instances where
the seller becomes aware of the purchaser's incompetency as an inciden-
tal by-product of the normal sales routine." 152 Instead, to protect them-
selves from liability, merchants would have to investigate each
customer's competence; by allowing such a situation to develop, the
court would shirk its duty "to foster certainty in business relation-
ships." 153 Second, under Florida law, the transfer of legal and equitable
ownership of an automobile terminates the former owner's potential lia-
bility.1 54 Third, the adoption of such a broad new public policy as hold-
ing automobile sellers liable for poor selection of customers requires
legislative action, since only the legislature can effectively weigh the vari-
ous interests involved.155
The Home dissent, however, was unimpressed by the majority's ar-
guments; it insisted that "[u]nder the Restatement, Potamkin is undoubt-
edly liable."' 156 The dissent claimed that adoption of section 390 "would
be a logical, natural progression of the present law of negligent entrust-
ment,"'15 7 and that no policy reason can justify holding liable one who
loans automobiles, but not one who sells automobiles. The dissent then
echoed the now-familiar dram shop argument that the public needs pro-
tection from dangerous drivers 158 and that the adoption of section 390 is
148, Id.
149. Id. at 562.
150. Home, No. 70,499, slip op. at 5. The dissent's rephrased question is quoted supra note 142.
151. Id., slip op. at 1-2. The court admitted that the Restatement (Second) clearly covers sellers
and lessors, but the court nevertheless refused to apply negligent entrustment to sales of automobiles.
Id. at 4.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id. (quoting Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
154. Id. at 213.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Id. at 7 (Kogan, J., joined by Barkett, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 8-9.
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therefore "compelling."15 9 It invoked the shopworn example of a
merchant selling a loaded gun to a child.160
The dissenting opinion seems to support the proposition that a valid
driver's license does not necessarily prove competence to buy an automo-
bile. While disclaiming that a common law cause of action would give
sellers a duty to investigate buyers, the dissent did say that a seller who
observes "behavior which indicates an inability to operate an automo-
bile" must decline to sell to licensed drivers who exhibit such behav-
ior.161 It failed, however, to define what standards of competence a
seller, who may be a sophisticated automobile dealer or merely a father
selling the family car to a son, should apply. Conceivably, newly licensed
teenagers, a group obviously inexperienced in driving, would not have
the capacity to purchase an automobile under the dissent's reasoning.
The dissenting opinion also ignores the majority's apprehension that
there is no practical way to restrict the Restatement (Second)'s future
application to sellers if section 390 is adopted. While admitting that cer-
tainty in business is an admirable goal, it asserts that "[c]ertainty in busi-
ness relationships should not take priority over the safety of our roads
and highways." 162
B. Problems with Judicial Regulation of Commerce.
The appellate court in Home recognized the serious commercial
ramifications of a duty to protect the public against incompetent users:
"The imposition of this new duty not to sell would create uncertainty
and retard the free flow of commerce." 163 In addition, the "creation of a
duty on the part of the seller to guarantee the acts of a buyer," 164 which
would effectively require independent investigation to establish each
buyer's fitness to use each product, would be "manifestly unreasona-
ble."165 These sentiments persuaded the Supreme Court of Florida to
reject the extension of common law liability to merchants who do busi-
ness with "defective" customers.
Indeed, it would be unreasonable-especially in view of the lack of
guidance ag to which customers are sufficiently experienced or compe-
159. Id. at 8.
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Home, 505 So. 2d at 563.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also id. at 563 n.2 ('To extend section 390 to cover negligent sales would effectively
convert an arms length commercial relationship into a parental one."); cf Fowler v. Park Corp., 673
S.W.2d 749, 759 (Mo. 1984) (Welliver, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 167-73.
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tentl66 -to create a duty for merchants not to sell or lease. The uncer-
tainty of the definition of a "defective" customer not only leaves the duty
at the heart of the negligent commercial transaction tort open to unlim-
ited expansion; it poses an uncertain risk of liability that businesses might
well find too great to assume or insure against.
In a vehement dissent in Fowler v. Park Corp., 167 discussed above, 168
a Missouri judge claimed that the majority had given lessors of equip-
ment an unprecedented new duty to actively and continuously investigate
the competence of a lessee's employees: "So extraordinary is the duty
imposed by the majority today that I can only surmise they fail to com-
prehend its ramifications.... [I]t would appear that... lessors of equip-
ment and other chattel must investigate the qualifications of every
employee of the firm acquiring the equipment who may operate it.' ' 169
The judge expressed shock that a court would be willing to create such
an amorphous and economically debilitating duty with so little
forethought:
It boggles the mind to consider all of the ramifications of this new duty
on the leasing industry in this state....
... [T]he majority creates a theory of negligent entrustment never
heretofore contemplated in the law and... in so doing, they jeopardize
the future of the entire leasing and lease-financing industry of
Missouri. 170
This judge seems to have realized that after Fowler, the duty to
screen patrons will no longer be limited to transactions regulated by stat-
utes, which provide reasonable and ascertainable guidelines. 171 Instead,
merchants will have to investigate their customers and then sell their
products only to those whom judges will deem competent.172 Such judi-
cial regulation of commerce will dramatically alter the way that business
has traditionally been conducted in this country, harming the national
economy by increasing the cost of producing goods and decreasing sup-
166. See, eg., Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 383 N.W.2d 840, 844 n.4 (N.D. 1986)
(implying that prior accident-free rental of crane to employer may not constitute sufficient "experi-
ence" to absolve lessor-begging question of how many prior rentals would constitute."sufficient"
experience); cf Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 919-20, 174 Cal. Rptr.
875, 884 (1981) (buyer's prior ownership of tar kettle indicated experience, which helped to exoner-
ate defendant-seller from liability for selling the kettle).
167. 673 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
168. Supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
169. 673 S.W.2d at 759 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 759-60.
171. See, e.g., supra n6tes 27-29.
172. See Fowler, 673 S.W.2d at 759 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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ply of goods to consumers.17 3
At a time when lawmakers are struggling to make American indus-
tries competitive in world markets again, 174 even minor judicial interfer-
ence in commerce would be ill-advised. Certainty about potential legal
liability is an important component of business relationships. It encour-
ages entrepreneurs to invest new capital in projects, thus promoting eco-
nomic growth, and it allows established businesses to accurately assess
the cost of marketing present and future products. 175 Unstable, judge-
made tort theories can make it more difficult for small businesses to ab-
sorb the risk of loss, crippling their ability to compete with larger busi-
nesses on the basis of price. 176 Moreover, the uncertainty associated with
tort liability in the United States has recently prompted some European
corporations to reconsider doing business with American firms at all. 177
This response by foreign businesses illustrates the impact that judicial
regulation can have on the economy.
The judiciary is the branch of government least competent to regu-
late commerce, either directly or indirectly. 178 The national economy's
sensitivity demands that only legislatures, after weighing competing so-
cial concerns, create the duties that underlie liability for negligent com-
mercial transactions.
Holding merchants responsible for the actions of "defective" cus-
tomers amounts to imposing a fiduciary duty17 9 on an enormous class of
173. See Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Home, 505 So. 2d 560, 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(en bane) ("sellers would sell fewer products, or they would sell them at a higher cost"), aff'd, No.
70,499 (Fla. Sept. 1, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 93694).
174. See Oninibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(sweeping trade bill, intended to enhance competitiveness of American industry).
175. See The Real Tort Conspirators, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1988, at 14, col. 1 ('Some moderate
predictability in the law is necessary before anyone can assess risks and establish what insurance can
cover and how much to charge.").
176. Cf. Saddler, Struggle Looms Over Standards in Liability Law, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1988, at
29, col. 3 (company president supports federal legislation to limit state tort liability after his com-
pany was held liable for $6.2 million; company lost its insurance and had to lay off 80 workers).
177. See, eg., CBI to Fight U.S. Liability Ruling, The Times (London), Apr. 28, 1986, at 17, col.
2 (reporting that European companies are finding it difficult to compete in American markets be-
cause of excessive tort liability against businesses); Fleet, Nader Charges Unfounded, The Times
(London), Jan. 16, 1986, at 19, col. 1 (reporting that Lloyd's of London has lost all confidence in
U.S. tort system).
178. See Vie Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Home, No. 70,499, slip op. at 4 (Fla. Sept. 1, 1988)
(Westlaw, 1988 WL 93694) (quoting Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d
644, 646 (Fla. 1986), for proposition that judicial branch is the branch least competent to receive
public input and resolve broad public policy questions).
179. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, 3.)
("Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place.").
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:755
innocent third parties. 180 As discussed above, such a fiduciary duty has
staggering commercial implications. 8 When courts have imposed fidu-
ciary obligations on sellers in other contexts,1 82 they have generally de-
fined the obligations narrowly18 3 and have enforced them for the benefit
of a limited class of people.1 84 In corporate law, for example, "under
certain circumstances and for some purposes the majority stockholders,
whether one or many, stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
to the minority stockholders."18 5 Those majority stockholders are for-
bidden to sell their interests to "defective" purchasers who they know
intend "to loot the corporation's treasury."1 86 Selling to a looter would
injure the minority stockholders of the looted corporation, violating the
majority's fiduciary duty to those investors.18 7 Although courts have
been aggressive in imposing fiduciary obligations in some contexts,188
they generally remain cautious in taking steps that would amount to judi-
180. See Home, 502 So. 2d at 563 n.2 (a "parental relationship" would be created); cf Fowler v.
Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 759 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting) ("[lit would appear
that... lessors of equipment and other chattel must investigate the qualifications of every employee
of the firm acquiring the equipment who may operate it.").
181. See id. at 759-60 (future of leasing and lease-financing industry in Missouri will be jeopard-
ized); supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577-78 (4th Cir. 1973) (in some circum-
stances, majority stockholders selling controlling interest in corporation have fiduciary duty to mi-
nority stockholders).
183. See, eg., id. at 578 (With respect to shareholder liability, "the majority is not an absolute
insurer against any wrongs which may be done to the corporation after the transfer of control or
against any decisions by the new owners that may not be in the best interest of the minority.").
184. Cf Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (For directors and majority shareholders,
the "fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the
corporation-creditors as well as stockholders." (footnote omitted and emphasis added)).
185. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 650 (Sup. CL 1941); see also Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) ("The controlling stockholder owes the corpo-
ration a fiduciary obligation .... "); Swinney, 480 F.2d at 577-78 ("majority stockholders who
assume the management of the corporation ... can be said to stand in fiduciary relation to the
minority under certain circumstances").
186. Gerdes, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 652; see Swinney, 480 F.2d at 578.
[I]f the sellers of control are in a position to foresee the likelihood of fraud on the corpora-
tion.., or on the remaining stockholders.., their fiduciary duty imposes a positive duty
to investigate the motives and reputation of the would-be purchaser; and unless such a
reasonable investigation shows that to a reasonable man, no fraud is intended or likely to
result, the sellers must refrain from the transfer of control.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
187. Cf Swinney, 480 F.2d at 577 (sellers of controlling interests held liable based on breach of
duty not to sell without adequate investigation when circumstances indicated possible fraud) (follow-
ing Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940)).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
316 (1987) (noting in insider trading case the importance of enforcing "Congress' stated concern for
the perception of fairness and integrity in the securities markets and the potential costs of forsaking
such legislated concerns, including fewer market participants").
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cial legislation. 8 9
V. CONCLUSION
The scope of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
its effect on sellers and lessors of nondefective products will be the sub-
ject of increasing litigation. To date, few courts have specifically ad-
dressed the negligent commercial transaction tort; even fewer have
recognized the potential commercial impact of this judge-made right of
action. Most courts have instead focused on adequately compensating
injured plaintiffs, ignoring the argument that a proliferation of negligent
commercial transaction suits against merchants will have detrimental
economic effects.
Congress and the state legislatures have the power to regulate the
sale of certain goods to specific classes of buyers, 190 and legislative regu-
lation of alcohol and inherently dangerous products is admittedly in the
public interest. Imposing a judge-made duty on sellers to match all kinds
of products with "acceptable" consumers, however, harms the industries
189. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (In determining
meaning of "manipulative" under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1982), the legislative purpose is controlling because "[i]nviting judges to read the term 'manipula-
tive' with their own sense of what constitutes 'unfair' or 'artificial' conduct would inject uncertainty
into the tender offer process."); cf Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting, in civil rights context, that "this Court in the future should be
extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative
Branch").
In the context of SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988), the Supreme Court, in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), considered whether to extend a private
cause of action under the Rule to a stock offeree "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). The majority declined to do so. 421 U.S. at 755. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Powell opposed broadening sellers' common law liability to offerees,
citing many of the same economic considerations that weigh against imposing judge-made duties on
merchants of chattels:
the courts already have inferred a private cause of action that was not authorized by the
legislation.... If such a far-reaching change is to be made, with unpredictable conse-
quences for the process of raising capital so necessary to our economic well-being, it is a
matter for the Congress, not the courts.
Id. at 759-60 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell understood that commercial liability affects a wide range of interests, and that
courts should allow legislatures to balance the concerns of undercompensated, sympathetic plaintiffs
with the needs of our free-market economy.
190. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce .... "); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, art. IV, § I (state legislature has full power and
authority to make laws "for the good and welfare of this commonwealth"); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 1
("The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives
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that the courts decide to regulate.191 Fewer goods will be produced, and
they will be sold to consumers at higher prices. Moreover, small busi-
nesses will find it difficult to compete with large competitors who can
more easily absorb the added risk of liability. In some markets, this risk
may create a formidable barrier to entry for small businesses, harming
competition.
The future direction of the negligent commercial transaction tort is
unclear. However, under the sweeping language of cases like Dillon, Bar-
sness, and Fowler, actions might conceivably be brought against an air-
craft supplier on behalf of crash victims for the sale of passenger aircraft
to an airline with a "poor" safety record, or against a passenger train
supplier for leasing coaches to an operator with a recent history of train
accidents.
In Home, the Supreme Court of Florida considered economic prin-
ciples that had previously been ignored in the debate over the negligent
commercial transaction tort's scope. American industries that feel that
jurists cannot or will not adequately address their interests when creating
amorphous new duties will welcome Home's new approach. As the
Home court has recognized, the legislature is the branch of government
best qualified to balance society's interests when an issue involves sub-
stantial economic impact. The judicial restraint of the Florida Supreme
Court in Home should serve as a model to other states forced to consider
the proper scope of section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts with
respect to the sellers and lessors of nondefective goods.
Robert M. Howard
191. See Home v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., No. 70,499, slip op. (Fla. Sept. 1, 1988)
(Westlaw, 1988 WL 93694) (automobile industry); Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 759 (Mo.
1984) (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (leasing industry).
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